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ANATOMY OF A MISCARRIAGE OF 
JUSTICE: 
THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF 
PETER J. ROSE 
SUSAN RUTBERG* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last fifteen years in the United States, one hun-
dred and eighty-three people have been exonerated on the basis 
of new evidence resulting from DNA testing. l This fact pro-
vides irrefutable scientific proof that the safeguards American 
jurisprudence has put in place to guarantee equal protection 
and due process of law to those accused of crime are insuffi-
cient to prevent innocent people from wrongful conviction. 
Wrongful convictions are neither isolated nor rare events. This 
realization has already been a major factor in improving the 
operation of the American criminal justice system. In depth 
* Susan Rutberg is Professor of Law and Director of the Criminal Litigation 
Clinic at Golden Gate University School of Law in San Francisco. From 2001 to 2005, 
Professor Rutberg directed the school's Innocence Project, a branch office of the North-
ern California Innocence Project at Santa Clara. She and Attorney Janice Brickley and 
a team of students won the release and exoneration of Peter J_ Rose in 2004-2005. For 
her work with the Golden Gate University Innocence Project, her thoughts on this arti-
cle, her superb legal skills, and her friendship, I would like to thank Janice Brickley. 
Thank you also to the GGU law students who worked on the Rose case: Marilyn Un-
derwood, Silky Sahnan, Emily Vena, Rodrigo Aberin, George Derieg, and Dan Taylor. 
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analysis of each of the wrongful convictions brought to light by 
post-conviction DNA testing, provides us with data which can 
be used to remedy the problems which led to the wrongful con-
victions in the first place. 
Although occasionally a wrongfully convicted person is able 
to prove his innocence through other types of new evidence, it 
is the DNA exonerations, based on indisputable scientific proof 
of innocence, which cast the brightest light on the shortcomings 
of the criminal justice system. These cases provide us with the 
opportunity to conduct a post-mortem investigation and dis-
cover all the factors that contributed to the wrongful convic-
tion. Working backwards from the known fact that an innocent 
person was found guilty, we can analyze what went wrong and 
propose remedies that will improve the way we operate our 
criminal justice system. By creating a more fair system and 
protecting innocent people in the future, we can restore public 
trust in the law. 
The original Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law began as a non-profit legal clinic, created by 
Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld in 1992.2 Students earned law 
school credit for investigating prisoners' claims of factual inno-
cence under the supervision of professors/attorneys and clinic 
staff. The New York project limits its cases to those where 
post-conviction DNA testing of evidence may yield conclusive 
proof of innocence. The demand for post-conviction investiga-
tion into claims of wrongful conviction is enormous. The Inno-
cence Project was organized to meet this need. Almost fifteen 
years later, the Innocence Network, a group of law schools, 
journalism schools, and public defender offices across the coun-
try, now assist prisoners nationwide in trying to prove their in-
nocence.3 Network members also consult with legislators and 
law enforcement officials on the state, local, and federal level, 
conduct research and training, produce works of scholarship, 
and propose a wide range of remedies to prevent wrongful con-
victions while continuing the work to free innocent inmates.4 
The Innocence Network's credo is laudable: the prospect of in-
nocents languishing in jailor, worse, being put to death for 
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American, regardless of race, politics, sex, origin, creed, or, 
most importantly, regardless of the individual's role within the 
criminal justice system.5 
The vast majority of the potential clients who write to In-
nocence Projects are poor and have used up all of the legal ave-
nues for relief.6 Their trials are over; their appeals have been 
denied; there is no place for them to go for free lawyers to con-
tinue their fight for freedom. Students put prospective Inno-
cence Project clients through an extensive screening process to 
determine whether or not DNA testing or other new evidence 
could prove their claims of innocence. Each Innocence Project 
across the country has a backlog of cases currently awaiting 
evaluation.7 
Golden Gate University School of Law was a part of this 
Network from 2001 to 2005 as a branch office of the Northern 
California Innocence Project, based at Santa Clara University. 
Although we no longer represent individual defendants, we 
continue to work with the Innocence Network on law reform is-
sues. Through a seminar, Wrongful Convictions: Causes and 
Remedies, our students study the factors that lead to the incar-
ceration of the innocent and actively engage in law reform pro-
jects designed to address these problems.8 
This Article examines one case in which students and law-
yers from Golden Gate University's Innocence Project won the 
exoneration of Peter J. Rose, a man who served nearly ten 
years of a twenty-seven year State Prison sentence for the rape 
and kidnap of a child before DNA proved his innocence.9 The 
analysis of this case focuses on how the conduct of two police 
detectives, the prosecutor and the defense attorney contributed 
to this miscarriage of justice. 
5 See BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD, JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN 
JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT (New American Library 2003). 
6Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See Wrongful Convictions Seminar, Golden Gate University School of Law, 
available at http://www.ggu.edulcourses/section.do?id=19718 (last visited Aug. 10, 
2006). 
9 Lorri Ungaretti, Releasing the Innocent, A GGU Clinic Helps Free an Innocent 
Man (2004), available at 
http://www.ggu.eduischool_oClaw/academic_law_programs/practical_legal_training/cli 
nical_programs/innocence_projectlattachmentlPeterRoseArticle.pdf (last visited Aug. 
10,2006). 
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1. How ONE INNOCENT MAN WAS PROVEN GUILTY 
A. THE CRIME 
On a Tuesday morning in late November 1994, thirteen-
year-old Alicia R. was walking to school in Lodi, California 
when a stranger hit her in the face and dragged her into an al-
ley. The man forcibly raped her from behind and fled. Mter-
wards, Alicia ran into the street and flagged down a passing 
car, telling the driver she had been attacked and asking him to 
take her home. As they drove away, Alicia pointed at a man 
walking on the street and said: "There he is!"lO 
At the hospital where she was taken soon afterward, se-
men and foreign pubic hair were found on Alicia's underwear. 
She told her family and the police that the man was a stranger 
and said repeatedly that she had not seen his face. ll 
Ron White, the driver of the car who picked Alicia up was 
also questioned. The description White gave of the man on the 
street was fairly generic: a white man with long hair and a 
mustache, wearing a bandana on his head, a green army 
jacket, black sweat pants, brown boots, and gloves. 12 A compos-
ite drawing of the suspect was published in the newspaper.13 
B. THE CREATION OF A FALSE IDENTIFICATION 
In 1994, Peter J. Rose was twenty-seven years old and liv-
ing in Lodi, California with his girlfriend and their two chil-
dren.14 He was acquainted with Alicia and her family because 
her aunt, Wendy, was a friend of Rose's girlfriend. At one time 
the two families lived near each other. Wendy knew Pete and 
did not like him. When Wendy saw the composite drawing in 
the newspaper, a couple of days after the crime, she called the 
police "tip line" and gave Rose's name. Mter Wendy's call, the 
10 Transcript of Trial Record at 174, 255, 266, 267, 272, 275, People v. Rose, 
L.P.D. 94·14431 (Cal. Dec. 20, 1994) [hereinafter "R.T."] (on file with author). 
11 Id. 
12 Alicia told police that White said the guy on the street had long hair and a 
mustache, but she had not seen the mustache herself. Transcript of Police Interview 
with Victim at 37-38, People v. Rose, L.P.D. 94-14431 (Cal. Dec. 20, 1994) [hereinafter 
"T.I."] (on file with author). Alicia (hereinafter "A'), Lodi Police Detectives Nies (here-
inafter "N") and Foster (hereinafter "F"). 
13 See R.T., supra note 10, at 673. 
14Id. at 391-392. 
4
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police showed both Alicia and White a group of photographs. 
The photos, a "six-pack" of mug-shots, included a picture of 
Pete Rose, but neither Alicia nor White selected Rose's picture. 
In fact, White selected another man's photo, saying: "This guy 
resembles him."15 
Despite Alicia's failure to identify Pete, and her repeated 
assertions that she hadn't seen the rapist's face, her Aunt 
Wendy kept insinuating that she thought Pete might be the 
man who attacked her.l6 Wendy also told Alicia that Pete's 
girlfriend had said he wasn't home at the time of the attack 
and that he was acting strange when he came home that morn-
ing. Wendy even took Alicia over to Pete's house to search for 
evidence. Their search failed to turn up any clothing that 
matched the description Alicia had given, except for a pair of 
black sweatpants. 
On December 20, 1994, three weeks after the still-unsolved 
crime, two police detectives brought Alicia to a small room in 
the basement of the police station and subjected her to a three 
hour "interview."17 During this interview, Alicia kept telling 
the detectives that she did not know her attacker.18 The two 
detectives, both men, repeatedly accused Alicia of lying. 19 
When she maintained that she was telling the truth and did 
not know the rapist's identity, they asked her to tell the story 
over and over, backwards and forwards, looking for inconsis-
15 Lodi Police Dep't, Photo Line·Up Fact Sheet, 94·14431 (Nov. 30, 1994) (on file 
with author). 
16 R.T., supra note 10, at 343, 541. 
17 See R.T., supra note 10. 
18 F: " .. [D]id you see this guy's face. Do you know who this was?" A: "No." T.!., 
supra note 12, at 18. A: "I don't know with who and 1 don't know why." F: "Yes you 
do." A: "No, 1 don't." F: "Yes you do Alicia ..... " Id. at 31. N: "Why do you keep say· 
ing , 'I don't know who it was'?" A: "'Cause 1 don't." Id. at 34·38. 
19 A: ''You guys think I'm lying?" F: ''Yes. 1 do .... " T.!., supra note 12, at 9. F: 
"Alicia, this didn't really happen did it?" A: ''Yeah, it did." F: "Who did you really have 
sex with that morning?" A: "I don't know." F: "Seriously?" A: "I don't know. . .. 1 
don't know who this guy was." Id. at 18. A: "Do you think that 1 know who did this?" 
F: "I'm asking you to tell us what really happened." A: "I am telling you what really 
happened." F: "Okay, but it wasn't forced, was it?" A: ''Yes, it was." F: "Alicia." A: "It 
was." F: "It wasn't forced was it? Who did you really get in a fight with and why did 
you end up behind that house?" Id. at 19. A: "I didn't know who it was." F: ''Yes you 
do." A: "Well, you guys want me to say that it didn't happen?" F: "I want you to tell us 
the truth." A: "I am telling you the truth." Id. at 20·21. F: "Are you scared because of 
the lie that's been created here?" A: "No, 'cause I' m not telling a lie." F: "I believe you 
are. And, if you're gonna stick to that story, we've made arrangements to have a lie de-
tector test for you tomorrow afternoon." Id. at 22-30. 
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tencies. One of the detectives told her to tuck her crucifix out 
of his sight ''because I keep looking at this thirteen-year-old 
young lady who keeps fibbing to me while she's wearing a cru-
cifix staring me in the face."2o The police scorned her belief in 
God, asked her to swear on her grandfather's life, asked de-
meaning questions about her body, accused her of prostitution 
and gang affiliation, threatened to tell her grandfather she had 
been sexually active, all the while continuing to call her a 
liar.21 These tactics eventually resulted in a tearful Alicia 
mentioning Pete Rose, saying, "My Aunt Wendy talked to his 
girlfriend and his girlfriend said he wasn't home that morning, 
and he's been acting weird eversince."22 Even after three 
hours of pressured questioning, the girl was hesitant: "I don't 
know if it's Pete or not. I don't want to say it is or not. And 
then you guys keep on asking me, 'Is it Pete? Is it Pete?"'23 
At the end of that "interview," the detectives again showed 
Alicia a photo spread that included Rose's picture.24 This time 
she selected his photo. Rose was arrested the following day.25 
20 T.!., supra note 12, at 29·30. A: "So, what do you want me to do, put it in my 
shirt?" F: ''Yeah, I do. Because it means something to me and it doesn't mean any-
thing to you. And this, and this lie has gone on long enough and it's time that it comes 
to a halt and time to come to a halt Alicia right now. We've, we've been very .... " A: 
"I'm not lying." F: "We've been very nice. We've gone out of our way over and over and 
over, out of our way to help you in this situation. We've offered you plenty of face sav-
ing, you can walk away with this without a lot of disgrace or anything else and you're 
choosing to keep it goin'. For what reasons, I don't know. For what motive, I don't 
know." 
21Id. at 23, 34-36, 27-30. F: "Did he pay you money to go back there and have 
sex with you?" A: "No." T.!., supra note 12, at 34. F: " ... [BJecause basically in your 
heart of hearts you know that this is a lie. In your heart of hearts, and yet your mind 
and your pride, even down to your Norteno pride, will not allow you to come up on this . 
... " Id. at 36. 
22 N: "Do you know who this guy was? You got an idea who this guy was?" A: 
''Yeah, I'm not sure though. 'Cause I don't want to say if it is or not." N: ''Tell me who." 
A: "His name's Pete. . .. And my Aunt Wendy talked to his girlfriend and his girl-
friend said he wasn't home that morning, and he's been acting weird ever since." T.!., 
supra note 12, at 62. F: "Okay, Alicia, let's cut to the chase a little bit. Was it Pete?" 
A: "I don't know. Seriously, I don't know." Id. at 62-63. F: "Is it possible? Is it possi-
ble?" A: "It could be Pete?" F: ''Yeah and you don't want to identify him because you're 
afraid of what, if you were wrong, oh my god?" A: "I don't know. I can't say it is or not. 
What if it's not?" Id. at 64. 
23 A: "I don't know if it's Pete or not. I don't want to say it is or not ... , And 
then you guys keep on asking 'Is it Pete?' I don't know." N: ''You're the one that said 
Pete, not us." A: "I think it's Pete." T.!., supra note 12, at 7l. 
24Id. at 74-75. 
25 Claim for Wrongful Conviction, In the Matter of Peter J. Rose, Exhibit C (on 
file with author). 
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When police searched his home for corroborating evidence, they 
found only the black sweatpants. 
The detectives' meeting with Alicia was tape-recorded.26 
The police gave the tape to the Assistant District Attorney. 
The prosecutor then interviewed the victim himself. Between 
the date of the police interview, December 20, 1994, and 
Alicia's testimony at the preliminary hearing several weeks 
later, the young girl became one hundred percent certain of her 
identification of Rose, and repeated her one hundred percent 
certainty in her testimony at trial. 
C. THE CREATION OF A SECOND FALSE IDENTIFICATION 
During Alicia's lengthy interrogation by the police, one of 
the things she told the officers was that the man she had 
pointed out to Ron White on November 29, 1994, as he drove 
her away from the crime scene, was just "somebody walkin'" 
and not the rapist. 27 A few days after he allegedly saw Alicia's 
attacker, White had looked a photo spread that included Rose's 
picture but did not identify Rose. In fact, at that time, White 
selected another man's photograph as "resembling" the person 
that Alicia had pointed out on the street.2B Two and a half 
months later, at the February 1995 preliminary hearing, White 
testified that the man he saw on the street after he picked up 
Alicia "resembled" Peter Rose.29 However, by the time of trial, 
the certainty with which White expressed his identification of 
Rose had increased to eighty percent. 30 Pointing to Rose in 
court, White said the man Alicia pointed out was either Rose or 
"his twin brother."31 
What happened to cause White's complete turnaround 
from his initial selection of another man's photo? Between the 
time of his alleged sighting of the rapist and his eventual tes-
timony at Rose's trial, White was arrested for felony possession 
of narcotics for sale.32 Remarkably, White's new case was re-
26 See T.I., supra note 12. 
27 T.!., supra note 12, at 74. 
28 R.T., supra note 10, at 767. 
29 Clerk's Transcript on Appeal.at 80, People v. Rose, No. S.C. 058356A (Cal. 
Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter "C.T."] (on file with author). 
30 R.T., supra note 10, at 178-180. 
31Id. 
32 Claim for Wrongful Conviction, supra note 25, at 7. 
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duced to a misdemeanor and diversion was granted.33 Since 
White had two prior felony convictions, had the prosecutor cho-
sen to pursue the felony, possession for sale, White would have 
faced a third strike, thus subjecting him to a possible life sen-
tence in state prison. 
Although the jury heard about White's arrest and the fact 
that the charge had been reduced, Rose's defense lawyer failed 
to effectively cross-examine White and detail the full scope of 
the benefits he received.34 Moreover, the significance of Rose's 
lawyer's efforts to impeach White with this information was di-
luted because the prosecutor called another Deputy District At-
torney from his office to testify that the disposition of White's 
new case was unrelated to his testimony in the Rose tria1. 35 
The jury was thus misled as to critical information regarding 
White's credibility. 
D. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
The prosecutor in Rose's case sent pubic hair and semen 
stains from the rape victim's clothing to a laboratory for analy-
sis.36 With the type of DNA testing available in 1995, DQ-
Alpha, the lab was unable to develop a DNA profile from the 
evidence. However, the pubic hair was examined visually and 
serology tests were conducted on the semen sample.37 
At trial, two San Joaquin County criminalists testified for 
the prosecution.38 One said that, based on a visual examina-
tion, Peter Rose could have been the donor of the pubic hair. 
The other criminalist testified that the results of the serology 
test performed on the semen sample were "inconclusive." How-
ever, she testified that she could say with certainty that Rose 
was within thirty percent of the population with the same 
phosphoglucomutase ("PGM") status as was found in the tested 
material. PGM, a genetic marker similar to a person's blood 
type, is an enzyme found in semen that does not contain 
DNA.39 The criminalist's conclusion about the pubic hair based 
33 R.T., supra note 10, at 186. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 721. 
36 Id. at 555. 
37 Id. at 567-569. 
38 Id. at 553, 578. 
39 The likelihood of obtaining an accurate PGM typing from a swab is directly 
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on visual examination should have been challenged as the 
product of unreliable "junk" science,4o yet the defense attorney 
made no effort either to exclude the testimony or to challenge 
the prosecution witness's assertion during cross examination. 
Even more damaging to Rose's defense was the fact the 
jury never heard that the blood type identified on the semen 
sample was not the same as Rose's blood type.41 This piece of 
exculpatory information would have posed a scientific chal-
lenge to the assertion that Rose was within the thirty percent 
of the population that could have deposited the semen. This 
evidence was not elicited on either direct or cross-examination. 
Because it could certainly have been characterized as po-
tentially exculpatory under Brady v. Maryland,42 the fact that 
Rose and Alicia have different blood types and that Rose's 
blood type was not found in the semen on her underwear is 
evidence that should have been provided to the defense in dis-
covery. Although this crucial fact appears in the criminalist's 
"bench" notes regarding the blood tests, it does not appear in 
her report. Only the report, with its conclusion of "inconclu-
sive" results, was turned over to defense counse1.43 
During the prosecutor's closing argument, he emphasized 
the importance of the criminalist's testimony, and character-
ized the "scientific" testimony as evidence that supported 
Alicia's identification of Rose as her attacker: 
They checked the hair. And the important thing isn't so 
much that they can't say it was the defendant, it is that they 
can't say it isn't the defendant, the very person she says did 
related to the lapse of time between intercourse and collection of the sample. PGM ac-
tivity decreases rapidly when swabs are taken more than two hours after intercourse. 
People v. Wilson, 128 Cal. App. 3d 132, 136-37, n.3 (1982) (citing Blake & Sensabaugh, 
Genetic Markers in Human Semen: A Review 21 J_ FORENSIC SCI. 784, 794-795 (1976»_ 
40 The Innocence Project: Junk Science, 
http://innocenceproject.org/causes/junkscience.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2006). 
41 See R.T., supra note 10. 
42 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
43 At a subsequent hearing on Rose's petition for writ of habeas corpus in state 
court, the criminalist testified that she did not consider it significant that Rose's blood 
type was not present. In her opinion, the sample contained insufficient semen to give 
meaning to its absence. In 2004 semen was found on that same evidence, and Y-STR 
testing excluded Peter Rose as the donor. These test results prompted Judge Stephen 
Demetras to grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the Golden Gate Uni-
versity Innocence Project, resulting in Rose's release from prison and his eventual ex-
oneration. C.T., supra note 29. 
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this to her. 
All they can say is the hair is consistent with the defendant. 
They can't say it is him, they can't say it isn't. They can do 
one blood test where they get this PGM, and they both had 
PGM one plus zero. [Thirty] percent of the people have PGM 
one plus. That means the other [seventy] percent have PGM 
one minus, PGM two plus and PGM two minus. They ran a 
test on that semen stain and it comes back one plus. 
If that semen stain were to come back one minus, two plus or 
two minus, then the defendant wouldn't be here today. But 
it didn't ... it came back one plus. The person she says did 
this to her has the same blood type she has. And they don't 
find any other blood type in that sample.44 
The serology testimony was simply wrong and should have 
been impeached during cross-examination by the information 
contained in the criminalist's own ''bench'' notes. Had the jury 
known that the sample contained a blood type different from 
Rose's, the PGM marker evidence would have been rendered 
irrelevant. 
E. THE DEFENSE CASE 
Rose maintained his innocence from the beginning, telling 
the judge "I don't need a[n] attorney, Judge. I'm not guilty."45 
He might have been better off without an attorney since the 
one appointed to represent him failed utterly to mount a per-
suasive defense. Among other crucial omissions, Rose's defense 
attorney did not file a motion to suppress Alicia's in-court iden-
tification as the product of coercive and suggestive police pro-
cedures. He also failed to use the tape of Alicia's police interro-
gation, in which she can be heard repeatedly telling officers she 
did not know who the man was, had not seen his face, and 
could not identify him, to impeach her testimony that Rose was 
the rapist. 
Several consequences resulted from these failures. The 
jury never heard about the strong influence that coercive police 
questioning had on the young victim's statements. Specifically, 
44 R.T., supra note 10, at 1018-1019 (emphasis in original). 
45 Jeffrey M. Barker, 'Nightmare Over' After 10 Years in Prison DNA Testing 
Helped Clear Man, THE STOCKTON REC., Nov. 4, 2004. 
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the jury never heard that Alicia's tentative naming of Rose 
came only after detectives called her a liar, implied she was a 
prostitute, suggested she had made the whole thing up to get 
attention, and insisted she take off her crucifix so she would 
not be lying in the presence of the Lord. 
Rose's defense attorney also failed to move to exclude 
White's testimony as irrelevant. Alicia had told police that the 
man she pointed out to White was not her attacker but just 
"some guy."46 The attorney could have used this statement as 
the basis for a motion to exclude White's testimony regarding 
the identity of the man he saw on the street as irrelevant. But 
no such motion was filed. Instead, White was permitted to tes-
tify at trial that he was eighty percent certain that Rose was 
the man that Alicia pointed out. The defense attorney's cross-
examination of White was miserably ineffective: he failed to 
ask White about his prior identification of another man or to 
establish the morphing nature of his identification testimony 
regarding Rose.47 
The theory of the case put forward by defense counsel was 
that another person, a man named Dooley, committed the 
crime.48 This theory was based on statements that Dooley al-
legedly made to another man.49 The problem with the theory 
was twofold: first, no evidence was presented to support it, and 
second, trying to prove that Dooley was the perpetrator effec-
tively shifted the burden of proof to the defense. 
Peter Rose did not testify on his own behalf. Although he 
had no prior felony convictions and no history of sexual as-
saults, Rose's trial attorney advised him against testifying. 
Rose's attorney abdicated any responsibility to prepare Rose to 
take the witness stand, telling his client that in his view he 
was "too hot tempered" and would not, therefore, make a good 
witness.5o Not being educated in the law and not knowing that 
he had the right to testify, Rose followed his lawyer's advice. 
The prosecutor mocked the defense because there was no 
credible evidence that the other man, Dooley, was guilty. The 
defense theory seemed to be no more than just the oft-ridiculed 
46 See supra note 19. 
47 See supra notes 27·35 and accompanying text. 
48 See R.T., supra note 10, at 52. 
49Id. 
50 Interview with Peter Rose (Mar. 15, 2006) (notes on file with author). 
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defense that Some Other Dude Did It (SODDI, as this defense 
is referred to disparagingly in criminal courts). In addition to 
putting on an inherently incredible defense that shifted the 
burden of proof from the prosecution, the defense attorney did 
the unforgivable: he essentially argued to the jury that thir-
teen-year-old Alicia was a sexual tease. In his closing argu-
ment, the defense attorney discussed Alicia and her testimony 
this way: 
You can look at demeanor. She came in here yesterday on 
recall .... What struck me is ... as she walked to this coun-
sel table, by [the prosecutor], to the chair in front of every 
one of you, the way she walked. I remember when I was in 
high school some of my female friends commenting upon oth-
ers, using the phrase along the lines of 'boy I wish I had a 
swing on my back porch like that.' This lady walked just like 
that. 
Why is that important? We go back to the statement about 
this lady being up and down Hilborn Street. She ... really 
did know at least who he was [referring to Dooley, the man 
the defense attorney argued was the guilty party]. Maybe 
not by name, but by sight, Mr. Dooley. She was teasing him. 
That is what the statements that came in were. 51 
Later in his argument, he said: 
Maybe she was flirting with this guy. Maybe she did end up 
down the alley with him and maybe at some point he wanted 
to do something that was a lot more than what she had in 
mind. Maybe that is when she figured out he really was se-
rious about taking her up on this offer and things weren't 
pleasant after that. 
Maybe. I don't know. I wasn't there, just like you weren't 
there.52 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor said: 
A little [thirteen-year-old] kid, she had the guts to climb up 
there and talk to you. But he wants to tell you she is . . . sa-
shaying while she is walking by the jury. Did any of you 
guys notice her teasing you? Did any of you notice her in 
51 R.T., supra note 10, at 1031·1032. 
52 Id. at 1035-1036. 
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tight jeans, a miracle bra? ... It takes a lot of gall to come 
up with something that pathetic. 
And, connecting the pathetic argument to Rose, who had not 
testified, the prosecutor told the jury: 
[Maybe that's the way they see her.] Because Dr. [L] told 
you many rapists know their victims and many rapists fan-
tasize about their victims. Why would he [referring to the 
defense attorney] come up with that argument? Where 
would he even get that idea? His client is sitting right next 
to him. Nothing about [A] came across as a tease.53 
After the jury found Rose guilty, the judge sentenced him 
to twenty-seven years in prison.54 Rose wept at his sentencing. 
His appeals were denied. All state prison time is hard time, 
but for a man convicted of sexual assault of a child the time is 
harder: labeled a child sexual offender, Rose suffered from as-
saults and harassment by other prisoners. His family spent 
their life savings to hire an appellate attorney to file a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus. The Superior Court denied the writ 
filed there. 55 While a second writ was pending in Federal 
Court, the appellate attorney contacted the Northern Califor-
nia Innocence Project. 
F. PURE LUCK AND PERSISTENCE LEADS TO PROOF OF 
INNOCENCE 
Students at Golden Gate University School of Law's Inno-
cence Project began investigating Rose's case in late 2003. 
Unlike so many of the cases we reviewed, this was one in which 
we realized that DNA testing might actually prove innocence. 
The first hurdle to overcome was to determine if the biological 
evidence still existed. Students wrote letters to preserve the 
evidence and called San Joaquin County officials: the clerk, the 
crime lab, and the DA's office. No one could find the pubic hair 
or the other biological evidence. In fact, students were told re-
peatedly that all the physical evidence in the case had been de-
53Id. at 1046. 
54Id. at 1159·1161. 
55 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel and DNA Testing at 5, People v. Rose, SC058356A (Mar. 18, 
2004). 
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stroyed. 56 
Persistence is perhaps the most important lawyering skill. 
When a court clerk told a student on the phone that all the evi-
dence had been destroyed, the student called back and asked 
for a copy of the destruction order. Once we learned exactly 
which evidence had been destroyed, we realized that one piece 
of potentially exculpatory evidence was not on the destruction 
list. 
While reviewing the appellate lawyer's file, a student 
found a copy of a pre-trial memorandum from the prosecutor to 
the Department of Justice ("DOJ") laboratory in Berkeley ask-
ing the DOJ criminalist to try to develop a DNA profile from a 
cutting from the rape victim's underwear. A report from the 
lab indicated that it was able to extract a semen sample from 
the underwear, but not to develop a DNA profile. This semen 
sample escaped destruction purely by accident. The evidence 
was never sent back to San Joaquin County and remained in a 
test tube at the Berkeley laboratory for nearly ten years. Had 
the test tube been returned to its county of origin as it should 
have been, it would have been destroyed along with the pubic 
hairs and the rest of the physical evidence in the case. 
Mter learning that the sample was still in existence at the 
DOJ laboratory, we consulted with a forensic DNA expert, 
Brian Wraxall. Wraxall believed that, given the advances in 
DNA testing since Rose's trial in 1995, it might very well be 
possible to get a profile from that same piece of evidence using 
YSTR testing. 57 Students supervised by Golden Gate Univer-
sity Adjunct Professor Janice Brickley wrote a motion for DNA 
testing with a request that the testing be performed by Wrax-
56 California Penal Code section 1417.9, enacted in 2001, mandated that all Cali· 
fornia counties maintain biological evidence in every case for the length of time that 
any person remains incarcerated because of that conviction. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1417.9 
(West 2006). Prior to the effective date of this statute, counties routinely destroyed 
evidence after the appeals were completed. Most of the physical evidence in the Peter 
Rose case had been destroyed before Penal Code section 1417.9 took effect. 
57 Since 1995, advances in DNA testing, specifically YSTR typing, permit more 
definitive genetic profiling from smaller samples. When there is a mixture of male and 
female DNA, and the female DNA is large, it may mask the male DNA. YSTR typing 
circumvents this scenario, allowing only the male DNA to be typed. Any YSTR profile 
obtained could thus be compared to a suspect for inclusion or exclusion. Using this 
methodology on the semen in the test tube at the DOJ lab, Peter Rose was excluded as 
its donor. See Declaration of Brian Wraxall in support of Defendant Rose's Motion for 
DNA Testing, People v. Rose, No. S.C. 058356A (2004). 
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all's laboratory. The motion was granted in June 2004.58 In 
October 2004, nearly ten years after Rose's nightmare began, 
that testing excluded him as the donor of the semen found on 
Alicia's underwear after the rape. On October 29, 2004, two 
weeks after the results of the DNA testing, San Joaquin 
County Judge Stephen Demetras granted our state court peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered Rose's immediate 
release.59 
The next day, a Stockton Record newspaper article de-
scribed the DNA exclusion and Rose's ten year odyssey toward 
freedom. Alicia, then twenty-three years old, read the story in 
the paper, called the reporter, and recanted her identification. 
She told Stockton Record reporter Jeff Barker: "I was never 
sure. The police pressured me to name someone. I only went 
along with them because I thought they had other evidence 
lined up against Rose."6o 
Two months later, on February 18, 2005, Judge Demetras 
granted Rose's petition for a finding of factual innocence.61 On 
the same day, a local newspaper reported that the Lodi Police 
Department had investigated its handling of the case and 
found no wrongdoing.62 As far as we know, neither the San 
Joaquin District Attorney's Office nor the County Conflict 
Criminal Defenders Program have conducted investigations 
into the conduct of either the prosecutor or the defense attor-
ney. 
II. LESSONS FROM THE PETER ROSE CASE 
A. THE PROSECUTOR: BENDING THE TRUTH 
1. Duty Not To Impede the Truth 
Courts have long recognized that, as a minister of justice, a 
58 See Order Granting Motion for DNA Testing, People v. Rose, No. S.C. 058356A 
(June 7, 2004). 
59 Order Granting Habeas Petition and Ordering Immediate Release of Peti· 
tioner from State Prison, People v. Rose, No. S.C. 058356A (October 29, 2004). 
60 Jeffrey M. Barker, Rape Victim Recants, THE STOCKTON REC., Nov. 6, 2004. 
61 Orders in Support of Finding of Factual Innocence, People v. Rose No. 
SC058356A (Mar. 4, 2005). 
62 Layla Bohm, Police Conclude Internal Review of Rose Case, Find No Wrongdo-
ing, LOD! NEWS-SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 2005. 
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prosecutor has a special duty not to impede the truth.63 That 
duty has been recognized implicitly in cases where courts have 
reversed convictions when the prosecutor engaged in conduct 
that distorted, subverted, or suppressed the truth.64 
In Berger v. United States,65 the seminal case defining the 
prosecutor's legal and ethical role as a minister of justice, the 
Supreme Court implied that the prosecutor's duty to serve jus-
tice includes the avoidance of conduct that deliberately cor-
rupts the truth-finding process.66 "It is as much his [the prose-
cutor's] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one."67 
In recognition of the unique function of a prosecutor, the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct include a special 
standard, Model Rule 3.8, which applies only to prosecutors in 
criminal cases. 68 The comment to Rule 3.8 observes: "A prose-
cutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not 
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it 
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded proce-
dural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of suffi-
cient evidence."69 
In Rose's case, when the District Attorney called the com-
63 Bennett Gershman, Article, The Prosecutor's Duty to the Truth, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 309, 316·317 (2001) [hereinafter Gershman]. 
64 Id. at 316·317 (emphasis added). 
65 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
66 Gershman, supra note 63, at 317. The misconduct in Berger included: misstat· 
ing facts during cross-examination, falsely insinuating that witnesses said things they 
had not said, representing that witnesses made statements to the prosecutor person-
ally out of court when no proof of this was offered, pretending that a witness had said 
something that he had not said and persistently cross-examining him on that basis, 
and assuming prejudicial facts not in evidence. The prosecutor's closing argument con-
tained remarks that were "intemperate," "undignified," and "misleading," including 
assertions of personal knowledge, allusions to unused incriminating evidence, and ridi-
culing of defense counsel. Id. 
67 Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. 
68 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004). 
69 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. a (2004); see also, APRL Panel-
ists Examine Why Prosecutors Are Largely Ignored By Disciplinary Officials, 78 CRIM. 
L. REP. 609 (2006). At a February 10, 2006 American Bar Association program, "Prose-
cution Ethics: Do Prosecutors Seek Justice or Merely Convictions?", sponsored by the 
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL), panel moderator James M. 
McCauley, ethics counsel for the Virginia State Bar, reported that "it is rare for prose-
cutors to face disciplinary charges even for clear violations of Rules 3.3 [requiring law-
yers' candor toward tribunals] or 3.8." Id. 
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plaining witness to the stand he was vouching for her credibil-
ity, and in effect, condoning the police interrogation tactics. He 
must have known, from listening to the tape of her three-hour 
police interrogation and from talking with Alicia herself, that 
she had repeatedly said she never saw the man's face, that she 
had rejected a photo of Rose in the first photo lineup, and that 
the police questioning was coercive. In short, at the time he 
met with the young crime victim, the District Attorney knew, 
or should have known, that Alicia's identification of Peter Rose 
as her attacker was far from reliable. 
Under these circumstances, the District Attorney clearly 
had a duty not to impede the truth by informing the jury of all 
of the circumstances surrounding Alicia's eventual identifica-
tion of Rose. Those circumstances included the lengthy De-
cember 2004 interview with police detectives, during which 
Alicia repeatedly informed detectives that she was uncertain of 
the identity of her attacker. Despite the pressures of the police 
interrogation,7° Alicia stated that "I do not know if its [sic] Pete 
or not."71 Mter listening to the tape of this interrogation and 
personally interviewing her, the District Attorney had to have 
been aware of the uncertainty of her identification of Rose. 
This uncertainty, coupled with her inability to pick Rose out of 
the first photo line-up, should have alerted the prosecutor to 
the unreliability of Alicia's identification of Rose as her at-
tacker. Although Alicia remained uncertain of her identifica-
tion of Rose while talking with police, at trial she testified to 
one hundred percent certainty that Rose was her attacker. The 
fact that this testimony came after Alicia met with the prosecu-
tor raises serious questions regarding the ethics of the prosecu-
tor's own interviewing techniques. Putting Alicia on the stand 
with full knowledge of her uncertainty and failing to elicit evi-
dence of her prior inconsistent statements violated the District 
Attorney's legal and ethical duties.72 
70 See supra notes 14·26 for examples of the police coercion. 
71 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
72 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (a·d) (2004). ABA Rule 3.8 
states, in relevant part: "The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from 
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause; (b) 
make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and 
the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to ob-
tain counsel; (c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of impor-
tant pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing; (d) make timely disclo-
sure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to 
17
Rutberg: The Wrongful Conviction of Peter J. Rose
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
24 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
2. Knowing Use of Inaccurate Evidence 
The principle that the prosecution may not knowingly use 
false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted 
conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does not 
cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to 
the credibility of the witness.73 The state violates a criminal 
defendant's right to due process of law when, although not so-
liciting false evidence, it allows false evidence to go uncorrected 
when it appears.74 In Hayes v. Brown, Assistant District At-
torney Terence Van Oss presented false evidence and misled 
the judge, jury, and opposing counsel, in a successful effort to 
enhance the credibility of the key prosecution witness by en-
gaging in the following forbidden acts: (1) before the Hayes 
trial, the State had made a deal with James's (prosecution's 
key witness) attorney for the dismissal of pending felony 
charges after his testimony; (2) the State specifically repre-
sented to the trial judge that there was no such deal; (3) the 
State elicited sworn testimony from James at trial that there 
was no such deal, both on direct and re-direct examination; and 
(4) the State failed to correct the record at trial to reflect the 
truth. 75 Mr. Hayes was convicted and sentenced to death.76 
The prosecutor's wrongful behavior in Hayes illustrates one of 
the many ways that prosecutorial misconduct can lead to 
wrongful convictions. The prosecutor's conduct in Peter Rose's 
case, allowing Alicia's false identification testimony to go to the 
jury without presenting evidence of her prior inconsistent 
statements, is another. 
a. The Accuracy of the Testimony of Ron White 
The District Attorney should have known from hearing the 
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sen· 
tencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating informa-
tion known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibil-
ity by a protective order of the tribunal." 
73 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 
74 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005). 
75Id. at 976-978, 985-988. 
76 Hayes, 399 F.3d at 988 ("Our criminal justice system depends on the integrity 
of the attorneys who present their cases to the jury. When even a single conviction is 
obtained through perjurious or deceptive means, the entire foundation of our system of 
justice is weakened."). 
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tape or reading the transcript of Alicia's interrogation that Ron 
White had not seen the rapist because Alicia told police quite 
plainly that the man she pointed out to White was just "some 
guy walkin' ."77 Therefore, White was not a witness to anything 
relevant. Without White's "corroborating" identification testi-
mony, Alicia's identification should have been viewed with even 
greater skepticism. 
Even though by the time of trial Alicia had reverted to the 
statement that the man she pointed out to White on the street 
was both the rapist and Rose, in light of the defense attorney's 
failure to elicit Alicia's prior inconsistent statements to the po-
lice on this point, the prosecutor had a duty to do so. Even if 
the District Attorney believed that her prior statement was 
born of confusion, he had an ethical duty to let the jury know 
that on a prior occasion the witness had told the police some-
thing different than her present testimony. This ethical duty 
on the part of the prosecutor exists whether the defense attor-
ney elicited the testimony or not. 
b. The Benefits White Received for His Testimony 
The District Attorney masked the extent of the benefits 
Ron White received after his testimony. The fact that a poten-
tial three strikes prosecution was reduced and diversion was 
granted after White's favorable testimony for the prosecution 
shows a motive to explain why White became more certain in 
his identification over time. Although the prosecutor did not 
exactly keep these facts from the jury, he called a witness, an-
other Deputy District Attorney, to testify that White's testi-
mony in the Rose case did not influence the office's decision to 
give him diversion. 
3. Duty Regarding Expert Witnesses 
If the prosecution becomes aware of information that casts 
doubt on the accuracy of the testimony of one of its expert wit-
nesses, it must disclose that evidence if it is material. 78 In 
77 T.I., supra note 12, at 74. 
78 See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 74 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing Napue 
v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959». In Giles two brothers were convicted of raping a 
sixteen-year·old girl. Id. A third brother was convicted for the same conduct in a sepa· 
rate trial. Id. at 68 n.2. At trial the two defendants testified that the victim had not 
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Rose's case, the prosecutor failed to inform the jury that the 
semen sample had a blood type that was different than 
Rose's.79 Had he done so, the prosecution's expert witness 
could then have testified regarding her conclusion that the re-
sults were "inconclusive." Permitting the experts to explain 
why she did not think that the absence of his blood type ex-
cluded Rose would have at least made the jury aware of this 
material fact and allowed them to decide for themselves if they 
believed the expert's explanation. By testifying that the results 
of the blood test were "inconclusive," the expert left the jury 
with the erroneous impression that she was unable to get a 
blood type from the sample. These issues raise the question of 
whether the District Attorney has an ethical obligation to make 
the jury aware of potentially exonerating facts when the de-
fense attorney, due to incompetence, does not elicit those facts 
himself. 
4. Disclosure Duties 
The prosecution's failure to disclose favorable information 
to the defense constitutes a violation of the defendant's consti-
tutional rights only if, and to the extent that, it deprives the 
defendant of a fundamentally fair trial. 80 To meet this burden, 
the defendant must show that the undisclosed information was 
material to guilt or to punishment.81 
California Penal Code section 1054.1 delineates explicit 
prosecutorial disclosure duties.82 Section (e) specifically im-
only consented but had in fact invited the act and that she informed them of numerous 
previous such acts. [d. at 69·70. The evidence allegedly suppressed was: (1) a similar 
complaint of rape which occurred between the event involved and the trial, which 
charges were later withdrawn by the girl, and admissions by her to police that she had 
previously had relations with numerous boys and men, many of whom she did not 
know; (2) a formal recommendation by a social worker of probation for the girl because 
she was beyond parental control; (3) a hearing resulting in commitment of the girl by 
juvenile authorities for "protective custody" because of harassment by young men and a 
suicide attempt. [d. at 70-71. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the state court 
for further proceedings to determine whether a new trial was required based on the 
Supreme Court's direction. [d. at 82. 
79 R.T., supra note 10, at 1018-1019. 
80 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
81 [d. 
82 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 2006) (''The prosecuting attorney shall dis-
close to the defendant or his or her attorney all of the following materials and informa-
tion, if it is in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney 
knows it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies: (a) The names and ad-
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poses upon a prosecutor the duty to disclose "any exculpatory 
evidence."83 Likewise, section (f) imposes the duty to disclose 
"relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or re-
ports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor in-
tends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of 
experts."84 The plain language of the statute imposes a duty on 
the prosecution to turn over any and all exculpatory evidence, 
including notes compiled by the prosecution's expert witness 
containing exculpatory information. 
This duty exists regardless of whether there has been a re-
quest for such evidence, and irrespective of whether the sup-
pression was intentional or inadvertent.85 The prosecutor's in-
tentional or negligent suppression of material evidence 
favorable to the accused denies the defendant a fair trial and 
requires reversal. 86 
Although Rose's defense attorney apparently never specifi-
cally requested discovery of the bench notes made by the testi-
fying criminalist, the prosecutor was under a professional and 
ethical responsibility to turn them over anyway because they 
contained exculpatory information. By failing to provide those 
notes to the defense, the District Attorney kept relevant and 
potentially exculpatory evidence not only from the defense, but 
also from the jury. If a criminal prosecution is a search for 
truth, the District Attorney should have a duty to tell the jury 
dresses of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses at trial. (b) Statements of 
all defendants. (c) All relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the investi· 
gation of the offenses charged. (d) The existence of a felony conviction of any material 
witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial. (e) Any ex-
culpatory evidence. (f) Relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports 
of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial, includ-
ing any reports or statements of experts made in conjunction with the case, including 
the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or com-
parisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the trial.") 
83 [d. (emphasis added). 
84 [d. 
85 Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 378 (1991). 
86 See, e.g., People v. Rutherford, 14 Cal. 3d 399, 406-07 (1975) (overruled on 
other grounds) (holding that suppression of substantial material evidence, bearing on 
the credibility of the key prosecution witness, is a denial of due process within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 
(9th Cir. 2005) (In assessing materiality of false testimony presented by the state at a 
criminal trial, the Court of Appeals "determine[s) whether there is 'any reasonable like-
lihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury'; if so, then 
'the conviction must be set aside."') (quoting Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F.3d 861, 881 
(9th Cir. 2003». 
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that the expert's testing reveals that the defendant's blood type 
is absent from the semen sample taken from the rape victim. 
In this case, the District Attorney failed to turn over the 
notes that revealed Rose's blood type was different from that of 
the victim. The District Attorney then proffered the criminal-
ist's testimony that the results were "inconclusive." This con-
duct, offering testimony that the serology tests were inconclu-
sive, while failing to disclose the fact that Rose's blood type was 
not present in the sample, is indistinguishable from the forbid-
den "knowing proffer of false testimony."87 
5. Inadmissible Evidence 
Under ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8, 
entitled "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor," and the simi-
lar mandate of Rule l03(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
prosecutors act imprudently when they jeopardize a possible 
conviction by cunningly attempting to place otherwise inadmis-
sible evidence before the jury.88 
Rose's live-in girlfriend was called as a prosecution witness 
at trial, and the District Attorney elicited information from her 
that Rose had hit her and was often drunk.89 The defense 
failed to object. The prosecutor then sought to elicit the wit-
ness' speculation regarding Rose's drug use.90 All of this evi-
dence was both prejudicial and monumentally irrelevant on the 
issue of Rose's identity as the rapist. With a proper objection, 
the evidence should have been excluded. In addition, the 
prosecutor was permitted to ask the defendant's girlfriend 
whether or not she thought Rose committed the crime.91 There 
was no objection to this call for improper and prejudicial specu-
87 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 
88 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8; and FED R. EVlD. 103(c) ("In jury 
cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inad-
missible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making 
statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury."); see also 
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C)(7) (1981) ("In appearing in his 
professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not ... [i]ntentionally or habitu-
ally violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence."); see also United States v. 
Schindler, 614 F.2d 227, 228 (1980) (discussing the Model Code and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence). 
89 R.T., supra note 10, at 393. 
90 Id. at 393-396. 
91 Id. at 400, 541, 623-24. 
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lation. When the prosecutor asked this clearly objectionable 
question of Rose's girlfriend, her answer was "no."92 He was 
then permitted to impeach her denial with earlier hearsay 
statements in which she said she wondered if it was Rose who 
had raped Alicia and also said "I wouldn't doubt it if he did 
it."93 Any probative value of the girlfriend's speculation regard-
ing whether Rose committed the crime and her opinion of his 
character was completely outweighed by the prejudice of these 
statements and should have been excluded from the trial. The 
prosecutor's conduct raises the question of whether a District 
Attorney has a right to take advantage of a trial attorney's 
failure to object to clearly inadmissible character evidence. 
B. THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY: ERRORS AND OMISSIONS 
A criminal defendant's right to counsel in judicial proceed-
ings is protected by the federal and California constitutions, as 
well as a host of state statutes.94 Specifically, the Sixth 
Amendment of the federal Constitution provides that in all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have 
the assistance of counsel for his or her defense.95 This right en-
titles a criminal defendant to secure counsel of his or her own 
choosing, and if he or she is unable to afford it, to the appoint-
ment of counsel. The right to counsel is among the most sacred 
and sensitive of all constitutional rights mainly because it 
serves to protect the unaided layperson during critical confron-
tations with his or her expert adversary, the government, after 
the adverse positions of government and the defendant have so-
lidified with respect to a particular alleged crime. 
1. "Counsel" Under the Sixth Amendment 
"Courts unwaveringly adhere to the view that 'counsel' un-
der the Sixth Amendment includes any duly licensed attor-
ney."96 According to at least one commentator, a narrower con-
92 [d. at 54!. 
93 [d. at 416, 598, 623·24. 
94 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 686, 858, 987 (West 
2006). 
95 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
96 Bruce A. Green, Legal Fiction: The Meaning Of "Counsel" in the Sixth 
Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433 (1993) (emphasis added). 
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struction of the constitutional term is warranted. Bruce Green 
argues that "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment should in-
clude only those attorneys who are qualified to render legal as-
sistance to a person accused of a crime.97 If one were to accept 
Green's suggestion that the Sixth Amendment requires more 
than a mere license, then many people, in addition to Rose, 
who have been tried and convicted with an unqualified attor-
ney by their side, have been deprived of their right to "counsel." 
Looking at Rose's attorney's performance in this case, one has 
to question his qualifications to represent criminal defendants. 
Yet Rose's defense attorney is an experienced member of the 
State Bar, and at the time this article went to press, still prac-
ticing in San Joaquin county.98 
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defen-
dant must show that his attorney's performance was deficient 
and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.99 
Deficient performance is demonstrated when "counsel made er-
rors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."loo Preju-
dice is established if there is a reasonable probability that but 
for the counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 101 
"The proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms."102 
These norms are reflected in American Bar Association ("ABA") 
standards. 103 The ABA standards state that a defense attor-
ney's "investigation should always include efforts to secure in-
formation in the possession of the prosecution and law en-
97Id. 
98 State Bar of CA: Harry Edward Hudson, Jr., at 
http://members.calbar.ca.gov/searchlmember_detail.aspx?x=114512 (last visited Aug. 
10,2006). 
99 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
100Id. 
101 Id. at 694. 
102Id. at 688. 
103 STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (1993), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjustlstandards/dfunc_blk.html#4.1 (last visited Aug. 10, 
2006). 
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forcement authorities."lo4 
3. Errors and Omissions 
Peter Rose's attorney made the following serious omissions 
and errors: 
(a) Failure to seek discovery of bench notes and to consult an 
expert to explain the significance of the information con-
tained in the notes. Rose's defense attorney did consult an 
expert, but because he was unaware that his client's blood 
type was not found in the semen sample, he failed to provide 
the expert with complete information about the serology test-
ing, and thus the expert's opinion was useless. 
(b) Failure to cross-examine the criminalist to elicit the fact 
that Rose's blood type was not present in the semen sample 
found on the victim's underwear. 
(c) Failure to proffer defense expert testimony to contradict 
the criminalist's opinion that the serology evidence was "in-
conclusive." 
(d) Failure to move to suppress in-court identification testi-
mony of both complaining witness and alleged eyewitness.105 
(e) Failure to properly cross-examine the complaining wit-
ness and alleged eyewitness. 
1. Regarding the complaining witness, the attorney 
failed to use impeachment material available in com-
plaining witness' tape-recorded statements to police. 
2. Regarding the alleged eyewitness, the attorney simi-
larly failed to file a motion to suppress, and also failed to 
seek complete information regarding promises made to 
witness regarding pending criminal case. 
(f) Failure to respect his client's autonomy regarding the de-
cision to testify. Instead, Rose's attorney counseled his cli-
ent, who had no prior sex offenses and no prior felony convic-
tions, that it would "not be a good idea" for him to testify. 
(g) Last, but certainly not least, the defense attorney gave a 
104Id. 
105 See, e.g., People v. Ledesma, 233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 440 (1987) (finding that the 
defense attorney's failure to move to suppress evidence of a telephone call that was in-
tercepted at defendant's residence by a police officer who had entered the premises 
without a warrantamounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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closing argument offensive to the mores of the community.l06 
III. WHEN DUE PROCESS FALLS SHORT 
A. No PROTECTION FROM PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Looking at the DNA exonerations, we can see patterns: in 
nearly eighty percent of the cases studied by the New York In-
nocence Project, mistaken eyewitness identification contributed 
to the wrongful conviction. l07 Prosecutorial misconduct was a 
factor in forty-five percent of those cases. And, in twenty-five 
percent of those cases, the specific type of prosecutorial mis-
conduct that contributed to a wrongful conviction was the 
knowing use of false testimony. lOB 
Lofty sentiments about justice and the role of lawyers ex-
pressed in appellate opinions are clearly insufficient to protect 
the innocent. Berger was decided in 1937; Brady was decided 
in 1969, and Hayes in 2005.109 Yet despite several decades of 
jurisprudence defining and decrying prosecutorial misconduct, 
Rose's case is one of the many illustrations of ongoing prosecu-
torial misconduct, unconstrained by prior court decisions. 
A professional, experienced deputy district attorney in the 
San Joaquin County District Attorney's office prosecuted the 
Peter Rose case. The fact that Rose was subsequently exoner-
ated did not lead to a public investigation of the prosecutor's 
106 See Shaff v. Baldwin, 107 Cal. App. 2d 81, 86 (1951). The court held that ar· 
guing facts not justified by the record is a serious error and to suggest that the jury 
could speculate, was misconduct, especially when uncalled for and deliberate. Further, 
this conduct is directly in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of 
California, Rule 5·200 (B), which states, in part: "In presenting a matter to a tribunal, 
a member: ... (B) Shall not seek to mislead the judge, judicial officer, or jury by an 
artifice or false statement of fact or law .... " CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 5·200 
(B) (West 2006). 
107 The Innocence Project, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Eyewitness_Testimony_Ann_Rev.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2006). 
108 See The Innocence Project, Police and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 
http://innocenceproject.org/causes/policemisconduct.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2006). 
109 Although, in reversing Hayes conviction, the court found the prosecutor's con· 
duct reprehensible, Mr. Hayes' prosecutor, Terrence Van Oss, is now a Superior Court 
Judge in the same county where he lied to the judge and jury in Hayes. See also Lynn 
Damiano, Note, Taking a Closer Look at Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Ninth Circuit's 
Materiality Analysis in Hayes v. Brown and Its Implications for Wrongful Convictions, 
37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 191 (2006). 
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conduct. Today, a dozen years after Rose's wrongful conviction, 
the prosecutor still works for the San Joaquin District Attor-
ney's Office. l1O 
B. INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION AGAINST INADEQUATE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL 
According to the Innocence Project analysis of DNA exon-
erations, incompetent defense lawyering was a contributing 
factor in thirty-two percent of the cases.l l1 Mirroring prosecu-
torial misconduct, ineffective or incompetent defense counsel 
have allowed men and women who might otherwise have been 
proven innocent at trial to be sent to prison. Failure to investi-
gate, failure to call witnesses, and inability to prepare for trial 
due to caseload or incompetence, are a few examples of poor 
lawyering. The shrinking funding and access to resources for 
public defenders and court appointed attorneys is only exacer-
bating the problem.112 
Peter Rose was represented by a defense attorney ap-
pointed by the court. His family hired an appellate lawyer who 
raised defense counsel's errors and omissions in an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim on appeal. The Sixth District Court 
of Appeal rejected these claims. The court found no prejudicial 
error and affirmed Rose's conviction. Prior to the entry of the 
Innocence Project into the case, the San Joaquin Superior 
Court rejected Rose's petition for writ of habeas corpus on the 
same grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel that appellate 
counsel had raised on appeal. Clearly in this case, the minimal 
"due process" afforded by the courts was not enough to prevent 
an innocent man from wrongful conviction. 
Yet, like the prosecutor in Peter Rose's case, the defense 
110 State Bar of California: Kevin Mayo, at 
http://members.calbar.ca.gov/searchlmember_detail.aspx?x=119380 (last visited Aug. 
10,2006). 
111 The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Aug. 10, 
2006). 
112 The ACLU has filed a class action lawsuit against the indigent defense system 
against seven counties in Montana· Butte/Silver Bow, Teton, Flathead, Glacier, Lake, 
and Ravalli - as well as the governor's office for failing to meet the national standards 
of indigent defense. The suit spotlights the need to enforce standards and improve reo 
sources for attorneys representing the indigent. See Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n, 
An Assessment of Indigent Defense Services in Montana, at 6 (Aug. 4, 2004), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/martz_assessment.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2006). 
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attorney has suffered no adverse consequences from his role in 
this miscarriage of justice. He continues to be a licensed mem-
ber of the State Bar.l13 
IV. POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
The authentic majesty in our Constitution derives in 
large measure from the rule of law-principle and 
process instead of person .... Nowhere in the Consti-
tution or in the Declaration of Independence, nor for 
that matter in the Federalist or in any other writing of 
the Founding Fathers, can one find a single utterance 
that could justify a decision by any oath-beholden ser-
vant of the law to look the other way when confronted 
by the real possibility of being complicit in the wrongful 
use of false evidence to secure a conviction in court.114 
The law has proven unsuccessful in protecting the innocent 
against prosecutorial misconduct, as well as insufficient de-
fense counsel. To the extent that the problem of inadequate de-
fense lawyering is caused by insufficient resources, some policy 
changes that would help alleviate the problem include: 
(1) Ensuring adequate pay for public defenders and competi-
tive fees for court appointed attorneys would attract compe-
tent attorneys to staff these offices and take cases. Public 
defenders and prosecutors in any given area should receive 
commensurate pay. 
(2) Caseloads for public defenders should never exceed the 
standards of the National Legal Aid and Defenders Associa-
tion. If attorneys are forced to proceed with too many cases, 
ethical complaints should be lodged with the appropriate 
state bar. 
(3) Every jurisdiction should establish standards of adequate 
defense. The public should be informed and educated about 
the requirements of an adequate defense. Standards would 
also provide notice to all defense attorneys of how much work 
is expected of them. 
(4) Federal funds for defense services should be relative to 
the amount of funding provided to prosecutors' offices in any 
113 State Bar of California: Harry Hudson, at 
http://members.calbar.ca.gov/searcblmember_detail.aspx?x=119380 (last visited Aug. 
10,2006). 
114 N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 236 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2001). 
28
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol37/iss1/3
2006]THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF PETER J. ROSE 35 
given jurisdiction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
What will cause a change in the behavior of police, public 
prosecutors and those who represent the indigent? The recent 
work of Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky, Executive Director of 
Cardozo Law School's Jacob Burns Ethics Center in New York, 
suggests some answers.ll5 The key is finding ways to hold in-
dividuals accountable. Yaroshefsky proposes sanctioning of-
fending prosecutors and incompetent defense attorneys, and 
making that process transparent so that the public can see that 
lawyers who violate the public trust and/or the trust of their 
clients are not above the law. 
There are models: following the example of the criminal 
case review commission in England,116 and the public inquiry 
model in Canada,117 some states have begun to create Inno-
cence Commissions specifically designed to determine what fac-
tors led to guilty verdicts in the post-conviction exoneration 
cases and to implement reforms. Some of those include: 
(1) Transforming eyewitness identification procedures. Mis-
taken eye-witness identification is the single most common 
cause of conviction of the innocent. Certain systemic 
changes, based on two decades of comprehensive social sci-
ence research, are becoming accepted. 
(2) Addressing the problem of false confessions: a factor in 
twenty-two percent of post-conviction DNA exonerations. 
Videotaping police interrogations-a powerful tool to protect 
the innocent and also to protect police from unwarranted ac-
cusations of coercion. This approach was adopted by Illinois 
after former Governor Ryan declared a moratorium on capi-
tal punishment in that state. 
(3) Investigations into unreliable forensic science and im-
properly operated laboratories. 
115 See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution 
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC L. REV. 275 (2004). 
116 The Criminal Cases Revi.ew Commission, http://www.ccrc.gov.uklabout.htm 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2006). 
117 Report of the Kaufman Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin, 
Executive Summary & Recommendations (1998), available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.calenglishlabout/pubs/morinlmorin_esumm.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2006). 
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(4) Reform the overuse of unreliable informant testimony by 
jailhouse informants. 
(5) The creation of an Innocence Commission, a blue ribbon 
panel made up of highly regarded professionals charged with 
the responsibility to conduct objective investigations, and in-
vested with the authority to issue public reports and impose 
sanctions. The creation of such a Commission would be rec-
ognition of the fact that the existing disciplinary system for 
attorneys has not been a workable model for either the regu-
lation of unethical prosecutors or incompetent defense attor-
neys. An open process is needed, unlike state bar investiga-
tive systems, which operate in secret. 
An Innocence Commission could do the following: 
(1) Develop protocols for the post mortem of each wrongful 
conviction where there are allegations of prosecutorial mis-
conduct and/or incompetent defense. 
(2) Examine post conviction wrongful conviction cases and 
make recommendations for change to deter future prosecuto-
rial misconduct and incompetent defense. 
(3) Develop clear and enforceable discovery standards for 
prosecutors and work with courts legislatures and bar asso-
ciations of each state to insure those standards are imple-
mented. 
(4) Establish systems of investigation and discovery that 
maintain minimum secrecy. 
(5) Develop a database of wrongful conviction cases available 
to the public. 
(6) Assist in the development of educational programs for the 
bench and bar about the necessity to report ethical viola-
tions. 
(7) Evaluate changes to the code of judicial conduct. 
One hundred and eighty-three DNA exonerations over a 
period of less than twenty years make it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to pretend that our current system of justice is fool-
proof.118 We cannot afford to continue to ignore the underlying 
causes of wrongful conviction. All of these wrongfully convicted 
criminal defendants lost years of their lives to injustice. The 
impact on their families and communities is incalculable. 
Yet each exoneree is a person who was charged and tried 
118 The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Aug. 10, 
2006). 
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by professional prosecutors and represented by licensed mem-
bers of the bar. Their trials were presided over by judges of our 
Superior Courts, their verdicts were rendered by duly impan-
eled jurors, judgment was imposed and their convictions were 
affirmed by appellate courts, and yet years, sometimes decades, 
later new evidence provided scientific proof that these protec-
tions were insufficient to prevent terrible miscarriages of jus-
tice. 
Implementing dramatic changes in the way we conduct 
ourselves as criminal justice professionals: police, prosecutors 
and defense attorneys, is not just about protecting the inno-
cent. It is about public confidence in the integrity of the crimi-
nal justice system. The needless suffering that Peter Rose and 
the other DNA exonerees endured should prompt us to take 
steps to restore that confidence. Establishing Innocence Com-
missions in every jurisdiction is a first step toward achieving 
that goal. 
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